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Abstract. J.L. Schellenberg argues that divine hiddenness provides an argument 
for the conclusion that God does not exist, for if God existed he would not allow 
non-resistant non-belief to occur, but non-resistant non-belief does occur, so 
God does not exist. In this paper, I  argue that the stakes involved in theistic 
considerations put pressure on Schellenberg’s premise that non-resistant non-
belief occurs. First, I  specify conditions for someone’s being a  non-resistant 
non-believer. Then, I  argue that many people fulfil these conditions because, 
given some plausible assumptions, there is a very good pragmatic reason to be 
a theist rather than an atheist. I assume it is more likely that theists go to heaven 
than atheists, and I argue there is a non-zero probability that one can receive 
infinite utility and a method of comparing outcomes with infinite utilities in 
which the probability of each outcome affects the final expected values. Then, 
I show how this argument entails there is no good reason to think that there are 
very many non-resistant non-believers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of divine hiddenness is defended today by J.L. Schellenberg. 
He argues that divine hiddenness supplies an argument for the conclusion 
that God does not exist, as follows:
S1. If God exists, he is perfectly loving.
S2. If a perfectly loving God exists, then non-resistant non-belief does 
      not occur.
S3. Non-resistant non-belief occurs.
S4. No perfectly loving God exists [from S2, S3].
S5. Therefore, God does not exist [from S1, S4].1
1 Schellenberg (1993), (2005a), (2005b).
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The idea is that, if God exists, the fact that he is perfectly loving would 
cause him to have a ‘bias for relationship’ with his creatures. He would do 
everything he could to be in relationship with them. However, it seems 
like in order for a person to have a relationship with God, that person 
must believe God exists. But God’s existence is not obvious; many people 
fail to believe simply because there isn’t sufficient evidence or because 
of other factors for which they are not blameworthy. Schellenberg calls 
these people ‘non-resistant non-believers’. They would love to know God 
and have a relationship with him if he existed, but they simply do not 
think there is enough evidence to reasonably believe God exists. The most 
salient characteristic of non-resistant non-believers is that they are not 
culpable for their nonbelief.2 Because non-resistant non-belief occurs, 
this gives us reason to think that a perfectly loving God does not exist.3
Traditionally, Schellenberg’s argument has been challenged in two 
main ways. Many have denied premise (S2), saying that God might be 
perfectly loving but allows hiddenness for some greater good. Another 
response is to deny (S3) and claim that we do have evidence that God 
exists, so rationality prescribes belief in God  – some people have just 
blinded themselves to the evidence. In this paper, I will not argue that 
premise (S2) is false or that premise (S3) is false; rather, I  will argue 
something weaker: that there is no good reason to think that there are 
very many non-resistant non-believers. This conclusion entails that there 
are fewer non-resistant non-believers than many people will prima facie 
think, and also that there are fewer non-resistant non-believers than 
Schellenberg assumes. However, this might seem insignificant. After all, 
as long as an argument is valid, the only way to attack it is by denying 
one of its premises. However, there are three reasons why my thesis 
significantly counts against Schellenberg’s argument.
2 Schellenberg does, in some places, refer to them as ‘non-culpable non-believers,’ 
but he seems to use ‘non-resistant non-believers’ more frequently, so I  will adopt his 
terminology. However, non-culpable non-belief might actually be a better word choice. 
Rea (in conversation) has pointed out that one can be resistant to a belief without being 
culpable. (This parallels the point made by Wainwright [2001] that reasonable nonbelief 
and non-culpable nonbelief come apart). For example, I may be inculpably resistant to 
a racist belief because I think it would be immoral for me to hold it. (Schellenberg might 
respond to Rea and Wainwright that there are certain propositions, such as ‘God exists’ 
for which resistance always implies blame). The main point here is that the culpability, 
rather than the resistance, is the important factor for Schellenberg; this will be captured 
in the condition I give for non-resistant non-belief on page 3.
3 Schellenberg (1993), (2005a), (2005b).
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The first has to do with the way Schellenberg’s argument is set up; 
I  think formulating the hiddenness argument deductively may be 
problematic. Of course, deductive arguments are nice and clean and 
easy to respond to (i.e. as long as the argument is valid, argue against 
one of its premises). The worry about framing Schellenberg’s hiddenness 
argument deductively is that, as a deductive argument, it cannot capture 
the intuition that the number non-resistant non-believers matters. 
Consider three worlds:
World 1: There are no non-resistant non-believers.
World 2: There is one non-resistant non-believer; nonresistant 
nonbelievers are an  extremely small percentage of people in the 
world.
World 3: There are 8 billion (or some arbitrarily high number) non-
resistant non-believers; everyone or almost everyone in this world is 
a non-resistant non-believer.
Notice that the third premise is a  claim about existence; it essentially 
states ∃x (x=a non-resistant non-believer). For this reason, the argument 
does not distinguish between the non-resistant non-belief in World 2 
and in World 3. Do we really want to say that we are in the exact same 
evidential situation with respect to theism in both worlds? This seems 
implausible, and I think this is good evidence that the simple deductive 
hiddenness argument is too coarse grained.
Someone might resist the above by insisting that the existence of just 
one non-resistant non-believer significantly lowers the probability of 
theism. Once we know one exists, theists have a big problem on their 
hands, so the number of non-resistant non-believers, as long as it is 
non-zero, isn’t that weighty. In response, I want to note that everything 
I’ve said is consistent with the probability of theism in World 1 being 
much higher than in World 2. The probability of theism might even take 
a huge drop from World 1 to World 2, and a much smaller drop from 
World 2 to World 3. For example, one might think the probability of 
theism in World 1 is 0.6, while it’s 0.2 in World 2 and 0.1 in World 3. 
This is consistent with what I’m arguing. My main concern is that 
Schellenberg’s original formulation of the hiddenness argument will not 
allow us to capture any differences in the probability of theism between 
Worlds 2 and 3.
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Suppose that the number of non-resistant non-believers matters for 
the probability of theism (and not just in the zero to one case). If this is 
right, something like the following seems true:
Inductive Hiddenness Proposition (IHP): The probability of theism 
is inversely correlated with the amount of non-resistant non-belief 
that occurs.4
Given IHP, it becomes clear why my thesis, that there are not very many 
non-resistant non-believers, is significant. The less non-resistant non-
belief there is, the less non-resistant belief counts against theism, and the 
less Schellenberg’s argument lowers the probability of theism.
Even if someone completely rejects this first reason my thesis counts 
against Schellenberg, there are two other reasons my thesis is significant 
that do not depend on taking the hiddenness argument inductively. The 
first is the role my thesis plays in a  larger argument that (S2) is false. 
Suppose God allows hiddenness for some greater good. For example, 
suppose it is very valuable that humans have free will, but that some 
humans make free decisions that cause God to be hidden for other 
humans (who are non-resistant non-believers). Consider again World 
2 and World 3. It is plausible that, given theism, World 3 is a worse state 
of affairs than World 2. So, the good of free will might outweigh the 
bad of a small amount of non-resistant non-belief, such as in World 2, 
but not a huge amount of non-resistant non-belief, such as in World 3. 
This example generalizes: if there are fewer non-resistant non-believers, 
at least some greater goods defences will become more plausible. Thus, 
an argument that there are fewer non-resistant non-believers than one 
might prima facie think can be combined with a greater goods defence to 
make an outright denial of (S2) more plausible.
One might worry that this sort of response depends on there 
being a  substantial difference between Worlds 2 and 3. However, this 
difference is not an evidential difference – a difference in the probability 
of theism – but an axiological difference – a difference in the value of 
4 Note that the rate at which the probability of theism drops may not be the exact same 
as the rate at which non-resistant non-belief increases. As I noted earlier, the probability 
of theism may take a huge drop when the number of non-resistant non-believers goes 
from 0 to 1. The point is just that as one number increases (the number of non-resistant 
non-believers) the other decreases (the probability of theism). I  am not making any 
claims about the rate at which this happens.
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the worlds, given theism. So, this response depends on World 3 being 
a worse state of affairs (given theism) than World 2. This is a notably 
different assumption than the one that played a large role in my first line 
of reasoning. It also seems pretty plausible to me, but if one is also not 
convinced, there is a third way my argument is significant that doesn’t 
depend on either kind of difference between Worlds 2 and 3.
This third way involves an  argument against Schellenberg that 
ultimately denies premise (S3). One natural way to argue that there are 
no non-resistant non-believers is to give arguments that make the number 
smaller and smaller, until one has established that there are none. My 
argument can be combined with other arguments against the occurrence 
of non-resistant non-belief to ultimately establish that there are no 
non-resistant non-believers. This is a relatively simple response, but of 
course, has the cost of denying that non-resistant non-belief occurs, 
a proposition that strikes many as implausible.
So, there are at least three ways my thesis can significantly weaken 
Schellenberg’s argument. But why think there are not very many non-
resistant non-believers? In this paper, I  argue that non-resistant non-
belief is uncommon, but I argue this from a novel angle. Most people 
who have responded to Schellenberg have taken the word ‘non-resistant 
non-belief ’ to have a narrow scope – referring to only epistemic norms. 
In other words, non-resistant non-believers are blameless because they 
have fulfilled their epistemic duties with respect to the proposition ‘God 
exists’; resistant non-believers are culpable because of their epistemic 
failures. For example, resistant non-believers’ beliefs may not be based 
on evidence, they may have failed to fulfil their evidence gathering 
duties, or they may be engaged in self-deception. Their blamelessness 
or blameworthiness can be traced back to their doxastic attitudes or 
another distinctly epistemic factor.
However, I want to examine Schellenberg’s arguments taking ‘non-
resistant non-belief ’ to have a larger scope, one that also takes prudential 
norms into consideration. I  take prudential norms to be a  function of 
probability and utility, while epistemic ones are merely about probability. 
Resistant non-believers are blameworthy because of a means-end failure; 
their culpability is not necessarily traced back to something distinctly 
epistemic (although it could be, because prudential rationality has 
an epistemic component). So, rather than arguing that there is sufficient 
epistemic reason for people to believe in God, I  argue that there is 
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sufficient prudential reason to form belief in God.5 Because many people 
have such a strong pragmatic reason to believe in God, God is not hidden 
for those people, so they are not non-resistant non-believers.
My argument does not depend on producing sound arguments that 
God exists; rather, it depends on a  story about why it is prudentially 
rational to believe in God. I intend to show that the prudential rationality 
of theism comes down to a particular probability judgment that most 
people will accept. Specifically, when prudential norms are considered, 
Schellenberg’s argument is no longer about the probability of theism vs. 
the probability of atheism. Rather, it is about the probability atheists will 
receive benefits in the afterlife vs. the probability that theists will receive 
benefits in the afterlife.6 This drastically changes the hiddenness debate.
The paper is structured as follows. In section II, I outline and explain 
my basic argument. In section III, I  defend the second premise of my 
argument, arguing that if one wants to increase one chances of receiving 
infinite utility in the afterlife, one should be a  theist. In section IV, 
I respond to objections, and in section V, I explain specifically how my 
argument counts against Schellenberg.
II. THE BASIC ARGUMENT
The fundamental claim I want to defend in this paper is the following: 
given the success of (a version of) Pascal’s Wager, there is no good reason 
to think that there are very many non-resistant non-believers. In other 
words, resistant non-belief is a fairly common phenomenon. Important 
for my argument is the concept of resistant non-belief. This is also 
salient for Schellenberg, but to my knowledge, he never provides formal 
conditions for being a  resistant non-believer. To both illuminate what 
counts as resistant and to be as clear as possible, I offer the following 
sufficient condition for a resistant doxastic attitude:
5 Here, I  do not mean for ‘epistemic’ and ‘prudential’ failures to exclude moral 
failures. In this paper, I will assume there can be instances of epistemic and prudential 
failures that are also moral failures. In fact, most of the epistemic/prudential failures I am 
interested in are also probably moral ones; I am suspicious that there is such a thing as 
non-moral culpability. For more on this, see Dougherty (2012).
6 Even if one questions the probability assumption, this paper still shows how the 
Schellenberg problem, when prudential reasons are taken into consideration, turns into 
a surprising and interesting debate about the nature of the afterlife.
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S is resistant with respect to a proposition p if
(1) (i) S believes <she has a stronger reason to believe p than to hold 
any other doxastic attitude toward p> OR (ii) S is blameworthy 
for lacking the belief in (i),
(2) S has control over her doxastic attitude toward p, and
(3) S chooses not to believe p.
Note that this is merely a  sufficient condition for a  resistant doxastic 
attitude – there may be other ways for someone to be resistant as result of 
a doxastic attitude they have. However, all I need is a sufficient condition 
because I just want to argue that many people fulfil the above condition. 
Nonetheless, resistant belief may occur in other ways.7
I  will argue that many non-believers fulfil (1) because they have 
a stronger reason to believe God exists than to hold any other doxastic 
attitude toward the proposition, and they are either aware of this or are 
culpable for not being aware of it. My basic argument is as follows:
(1) One should perform the action that maximizes EV.
(2) Cultivating belief in God maximizes EV.
(3) Therefore, one should cultivate belief in God [1,2].
Premise 1: I will simply assume this premise for the sake of this paper. 
I know challenges have been brought to this premise in several paradoxes 
such as the St. Petersburg paradox,8 the Pasadena paradox,9 etc. However, 
the ‘maximize EV’ norm is a classic and orthodox norm for prudential 
rationality and has quite a bit of intuitive appeal. For this reason, I do 
not take this to be a highly controversial assumption. Either way, it is 
an assumption of my argument; defending this premise lies beyond the 
scope of this paper.10
Premise 2: This premise states that S’s cultivating belief in God maximizes 
expected value. This is because S’s being a theist increases the probability 
S will receive infinite utility (presumably, in the afterlife). I will spend 
the rest of the paper defending this premise, because I take it to be the 
7 Thanks to Blake McAllister.
8 See Martin (2013).
9 See Nover and Hajek (2004).
10 Later in this paper, I will suggest that the maximize-EV norm should be modified in 
the infinite case. However, my main suggestion is not a denial that one should maximize 
expected value, but that one should calculate expected value differently when infinite 
utilities are involved.
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most controversial part of the argument. When I say I will defend this 
premise, I will take myself to show that the premise relies on a particular 
judgment about the probability of outcomes that most people will 
accept: namely, that the probability of an afterlife in which theists receive 
infinite rewards and atheists do not is more probable than an afterlife in 
which atheists receive infinite rewards and theists do not. Alternatively, 
this could be added as an assumption of my argument. Either way, being 
a  theist will be prudentially rational for any person who accepts the 
crucial probability judgment. Since most people will accept the crucial 
probability judgment, most people will have a strong prudential reason 
to cultivate theistic beliefs, and so more people will fulfil condition (1) 
than it might seem prima facie.
III. DEFENDING PREMISE 2
My defence of (P2) has three elements. (i) There is a non-zero and non-
infinitesimal probability that <there is afterlife in which it is possible 
to receive infinite utility>, (ii) the traditional way expected values are 
calculated should be modified to accommodate infinite utilities and 
(iii) the probability that <theists receive infinite utility in the afterlife 
and atheists do not> is higher than the probability that <atheists receive 
infinite utility in the afterlife and theists do not>. I will argue for (i) and 
(ii), assume (iii), and then explain how (P2) follows from (i) – (iii).
3.1. The Possibility of Infinite Utility
To defend premise 2, I  must first establish that there is some non-
zero, non-infinitesimal probability that one can receive infinite utility. 
Of course, if there is no chance one could receive infinite utility, then 
one has no reason to care which actions might be relevant for it – so 
all actions, including those related to one’s beliefs about theism, would 
be irrelevant to receiving infinite utility. Since it seems implausible to 
suppose one might receive infinite utility during one’s earthly life, I will 
assume if one receives infinite utility, it will happen the in afterlife (if 
there is one, of course). Let’s called the proposition there is an afterlife in 
which it is possible to receive infinite utility the Infinite Utility Proposition 
(from here on, IUP).
Since we are worried here about pragmatic considerations (i.e. 
actions that would maximize expected value) and the value here we are 
worried about is infinite, then all that is needed for the decision matrix 
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is that the probability of IUP is greater than zero and not infinitesimal. 
This is because, when calculating the expected value of an action A, the 
probability of a state of nature is multiplied by the utility one would gain 
if they performed A given that state of nature occurs.11 Since the utility in 
question here is infinite, as long as IUP has a non-zero, non-infinitesimal 
probability, actions relevant to that the outcome will have an  infinite 
expected value.12
Before I argue that Pr(IUP)>0 and non-infinitesimal, I first want to 
note that, if there is an afterlife, there seems to be more than one way to 
receive infinite utility in it. One way would be to receive finite utility for 
an infinite length of time, i.e. 10 utiles a day for all eternity. This might 
satisfy some who think that receiving infinite utility in a finite amount 
of time would be some sort of impossible ‘supertask’ for a finite person.13 
However, others might have the intuition that it is metaphysically 
possible for a  finite person to experience infinite utility in a  finite 
amount of time, maybe at the beatific vision or as part of Divinization. 
One might even think infinite utility is possible in an atemporal state. 
For example, Eleonore Stump argues that God’s existing atemporally is 
consistent with His mind’s having a variety of faculties, experiences, and 
activities, such as knowing things and even experiencing emotions.14 
One might think the afterlife is like that for human beings  – humans 
have an  infinitely valuable experience of being united with God, even 
without the passage of time. Any of these versions of the afterlife is also 
consistent with premise two. It is important to reiterate, however, that 
even if humans can receive infinite utility in a finite amount of time (or 
atemporally), I am assuming that this cannot occur in one’s earthly life. 
But premise two is still relatively ecumenical; it is open to multiple ways 
of receiving infinite utility, and does not depend on the possibility of 
persons performing supertasks.
11 ‘State of nature’ is misleading. Not only is it misleading for decision making in 
general (a state of nature can include possible decisions by other persons) but it also is 
specifically misleading in this context, as it may seem odd to think of different possible 
afterlives as different states of nature. However, I will retain the term because it is part of 
standard decision theory terminology.
12 I will be using ‘expected value’ and ‘expected utility’ interchangeably in this paper.
13 One worry for this view is that there will never be a time at which I have received 
infinite utility. In response, it seems like there is still a clear and meaningful way in which 
the person in this scenario receives infinite utility, even if it there is no time at which it is 
completed. For more on this objection, see Vander Lann, (MS).
14 See Stump and Kretzmann (1981: 18-19).
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But do we have reasons to think that IUP has a  non-infinitesimal 
probability greater than 0? I think we do, for several reasons. One reason 
to give it a  non-zero probability is that, regularity [one of the axioms 
of probability] states that only contradictions should receive probability 
0; some people go even further and argue that no proposition should 
receive probability 0. However, even if some propositions are given 
probability 0, IUP does not seem like a likely candidate.
Two, there is an argument from peer disagreement that IUP not be 
assigned a zero or infinitesimal probability. Many smart people, including 
philosophers, theologians, and people who study religion believe IUP. 
While this may not give us reason to assign IUP a high probability, it 
seems like a  reason not to assign it probability 0 or an  infinitesimal 
probability.
Three, when one considers the large number of actions available to 
an all-powerful Being, this should also increase the probability of IUP. 
Since most stories about the afterlife are theistic, considerations about 
what actions are possible for an all-powerful God seem relevant when 
assessing the probability of IUP. If God exists, the probability that it is in 
his power to cause a person to experience infinite utility seems greater 
than 0 and non-infinitesimal.
In sum, the person who rejects IUP has a difficult burden of proof. If he 
wants to give it probability 0, he must argue that some non-contradictory 
propositions should be assigned probability 0. Two, he must overcome all 
the arguments from peer disagreement that IUP should not be assigned 
probability 0/infinitesimal. Three, he must argue that the probability of 
IUP is zero or infinitesimal, even given the vast array of actions available 
to an all-powerful Being. This burden of proof seems very difficult to 
overcome, and in the meantime, it seems fair to conclude that Pr(IUP)>0 
and non-infinitesimal.
So, given that IUP has a non-zero, non-infinitesimal probability, we 
have a decision theoretic reason to be concerned with our post mortem 
destiny. But what actions are relevant to our post-mortem destiny? I will 
argue that one such action is the cultivation of theistic beliefs.
3.2. An Objection from Hajek
(P2) also depends on responding to an  objection from Alan Hajek 
that relates to problems infinite utility creates for the expected value 
95WAGERING AGAINST DIVINE HIDDENNESS
equation.15 To understand the objection, recall a simple version equation 
for expected value, where [S1, S2 ... ] are possible states of nature:
The expected value of an action A =
Pr(S1) * (utility of performing A | S1) + Pr(S2) * (utility of performing 
A | S2) + ...
Note that, for each state of nature, the relevant probability is multiplied 
by the relevant utility. Hajek points out that, given the equation, if the 
utility in question is infinite, the probability is irrelevant, as long as it is 
non-zero. For this reason, it isn’t clear why one should directly believe in 
God rather than perform another action, A*, that is consistent with one’s 
eventually coming to believe in God. As long as the probability that one 
will come to believe in God given that one performs A* is non-zero,16 
one’s performing A* has an infinite expected value.17
Hajek is correct to note that this is a  problem, but rather than 
being a  problem for arguments that one should believe in God given 
expected value considerations, it is an  argument that we should not 
treat all infinities equally. Consider a scenario where there are two doors 
you can pick from. For each door, there is a possibility you will receive 
infinite utility. However, if you pick door number 1, the probability you 
will receive infinite utility is 0.000001. If you pick door number 2, the 
probability you will receive infinite utility is 0.999999. For both doors, if 
you don’t receive the infinite utility, you will be annihilated. The decision 
matrix is as follows:
Heaven Annihilation EV
Door 1 0.000001*ω 0 ω
Door 2 0.999999*ω 0 ω
If we assume that infinity multiplied by anything is infinity, both doors 
have the same expected value. However, this is clearly counterintuitive – 
it seems like one should obviously pick door number 2.
Hajek’s argument and this thought experiment show that, in cases 
involving infinite utilities, we will need to modify the way we calculate 
15 Hajek (2003).
16 And, presumably, non-infinitesimal.
17 Hajek (2003: 30-31).
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the expected values so that probabilities make a difference in the final 
expected values. One possible way to do this is to take the probabilities 
of each state of nature and then treat the utilities as a  limit function, 
making the utilities bigger and bigger until the expected values stand in 
a consistent ratio to each other. I have argued for a method similar to this 
one elsewhere.18 There are other ways to capture these differences as well. 
Bartha has a version that involves taking ratios between different sizes of 
infinities, and Chen and Rubio have suggested a method that involves 
using surreal numbers.19 Whichever method you prefer, the point is that 
we must use an expected utility function that captures the differences in 
probabilities, so that all options consistent with the possibility of getting 
infinite utility don’t turn out to have the exact same expected value.
Hajek considers these options but rejects them because he believes 
they are inconsistent with parts of Pascal’s theology.20 Specifically, he cites 
textual evidence that Pascal was committed to salvation (the utility of 
the afterlife) being the greatest thing possible. If salvation is the greatest 
thing possible, reasons Hajek, then the utility of the afterlife cannot 
be reflexive under addition.21 Here’s why: if ω represents the value of 
salvation, then ω+1 cannot be more valuable than ω. So ω+1 cannot be 
even ordinally larger than ω. The same sort of reasoning would seem to 
apply to multiplication: if ω is the value of salvation, 2ω cannot be more 
valuable than ω. However, if the utility of the afterlife is not reflexive 
under either addition or multiplication, we cannot distinguish between 
0.999999ω and 0.000001ω, and so we are forced to be indifferent between 
door 1 and door 2. This result seems absurd, so we should reject some 
part of the above reasoning.
First, I think we should clarify what it means for salvation to be ‘the 
greatest thing possible’. Changing the probability I  will get something 
doesn’t seem to change the value of the thing itself; it may change other 
things, such as what actions would be rational for me, but it doesn’t bear 
on the intrinsic worth of the object. So, suppose salvation is the greatest 
thing possible; I  see no reason to conclude from this that I  should be 
indifferent between a 0.01 chance at it and a 0.99 chance at it. Hajek’s 
argument seems to fail to distinguish between the value of something and 
18 See Jackson and Rogers ‘Salvaging Pascal’s Wager’ (MS).
19 See Bartha (2007) and Chen and Rubio (MS).
20 Hajek (2003: 45-47).
21 Hajek (2003: 47).
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my chance at getting that thing. Incorporating probabilities into decisions 
relevant to one’s salvation is consistent with a strong conception of the 
maximal value of salvation. Second, ‘greatest thing possible’ is somewhat 
vague, and weaker versions of Pascal’s assumption are consistent with 
the doctrine that different people get different afterlife benefits, i.e., your 
salvation is ordinally or cardinally bigger than mine.22
The lesson we should take from Hajek is this: the probability of 
an outcome, even an outcome with an infinite utility, matters. For two 
outcomes that both have infinite utilities, all else equal, the one with the 
higher probability has a higher expected value than the one with lower 
probability. Second, an outcome with a  low probability and an infinite 
utility will always have a higher expected than an outcome with a high 
probability and a  finite utility.23 Put another way: when ranking the 
expected value of outcomes, the ones with infinite utility will always 
be ranked above the ones with finite utility, and among the ones with 
infinite utility, the ones that are more probable will be ranked above the 
less probable.
3.3. Theism and Maximizing Expected Value
Now, I want to argue that one should cultivate theistic beliefs in order to 
maximize expected value. Note what we have established so far:
(i) There is a non-zero probability that there is an afterlife in which it 
is possible to receive infinite expected utility.
(ii) Our modified expected value equation will (a) always rank 
outcomes with infinite utility higher than those with finite utility 
22 For example, Jonathan Edwards suggests that the happiness each person’s 
experiences in the afterlife is relative to their capacities (The Works of Jonathan Edwards, 
vol 2., p. 902). For example, I may only be able to experience 8 units of happiness a day, 
while someone else has the ability to experience 10 units of happiness a day. So, in heaven, 
we will all receive our ‘maximum capacity’ for happiness, but people are equipped with 
different capacities. This is one way to maintain that for each person, salvation is the 
greatest thing possible (relative to their capacities) but that we each still receive different 
utilities.
23 For example, if we use a limit function, the religions with finite utilities will ‘drop 
out.’ If we use surreal numbers, our final values will include ordinally ranked infinite 
numbers, and every finite number will be ordinally ranked below all the infinite ones. 
So, even with a new method of calculating expected value, it is relatively easy to see that 
outcomes involving infinite utility will be privileged.
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and [after (a) has been applied] (b) rank outcomes with higher 
probability over those with lower probability.24
At this point, I want to add my crucial probability judgment that I alluded 
to in the explanation of premise (P2):
(iii) The probability that <theists receive infinite utility in the afterlife 
and atheists do not> is higher than the probability that <atheists 
receive infinite utility in the afterlife and theists do not>.
(i) – (iii) are all we need for a full defence of premise (P2). To see why, 
consider a  hypothetical agent, S, who is considering whether to take 
actions that cultivate theistic beliefs or atheistic beliefs. Consistent with 
(i), S believes there is a non-zero probability that there is an afterlife in 
which it is possible for her to receive infinite expected utility. Since we 
assumed at the beginning of the paper the afterlife is the only means by 
which it is possible to receive infinite expected utility, the only states of 
the world we will consider are those that involve the afterlife.
Let’s suppose (leaving open the question of whether God exists or 
not) S considers three possible afterlives:
A1. Theists receive infinite utility; atheists do not.
A2. Atheists receive infinite utility; theists do not.
A3. Atheists and theists receive the same (infinite) utility.
Note that if A3 is the case, it won’t matter if S cultivates theistic or 
atheistic beliefs. As long as A1 and A2 have non-zero probabilities for 
S, A3 is irrelevant. Therefore, we needn’t consider A3; A1 and A2 are 
the only afterlives relevant for S’s decision. Thus, all we need is that 
the Pr(A1) > Pr(A2), which is assumed by (iii), and then, in order to 
maximize expected value, S should cultivate theistic beliefs.
The decision matrix for the above reasoning is as follows:
Theists receive 
infinite utility, 
atheists do not (p)
Atheists receive infinite 
utility, theists do not (p’) EV
Theism pω p’(-ω) pω + p’(-ω)
Atheism p(-ω) p’(ω) p’(ω) + p(-ω)
24 A more complex expected utility equation could also account for different sizes of 
infinity (i.e. countable infinity, uncountable infinity, etc.) For the sake of simplicity, I will 
assume all the outcomes refer to the same size of infinity.
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That p > p’ is established by (iii), the crucial probability judgment. Given 
this, [pω + p’(-ω)] will be greater than [p’(ω) + p(-ω)], and so in order to 
maximize expected value, one should cultivate theistic belief.
I explain how this conclusion interacts directly with Schellenberg in 
section V, but first, I respond to some objections to the above argument.
IV. OBJECTIONS
An  initial objection to the above is that belief is often taken to be 
involuntary.25 Attempts to believe in God for practical reasons do not 
guarantee that one will actually end up forming beliefs in God. So, even 
if many people fulfil conjunct (1) of the condition for non-resistant 
non-belief, they do not fulfil conjunct (2). These people, then, are not 
resistant, and the problem of hiddenness is unchanged.
First, even though most people do not think that we have direct 
control over our beliefs, we still clearly have some kind of indirect 
control over what we believe. We can control our belief-forming habits, 
what we pay attention to, what we read, who we spend time with, etc. 
Note that earlier in the paper, I formed the decision in question about 
what beliefs one should cultivate, indicating that it will be a  process, 
rather than an immediate decision. So, we should do everything we can 
to cultivate belief in God. Even if one does not successfully cultivate full 
belief in God, it seems that one who attempted to do so and committed 
one’s life to God in other ways would be more likely in a  position to 
receive an infinite reward than one who didn’t. Additionally, note that 
it is difficult to predict how successful an attempted conversion will be; 
one might claim that coming to believe in God would be impossible or at 
least very difficult, but in many cases, one cannot know this for sure until 
one sincerely tries. Finally, religious texts support the idea that those 
who attempt to cultivate theistic beliefs will succeed.26
A second way one might object to my argument is as follows: belief 
should only be concerned with truth. God wouldn’t reward someone for 
believing for a decision theoretic reason; that’s believing in God for a bad 
reason. For example, W.K. Clifford famously said that it is always wrong, 
everywhere, to believe without evidence.27 More recently, Antony Flew 
25 See, i.e. Williams (1970) and Scott-Kakures (2000).
26 Matt 7:7, Jer 33:3, Deut 4:29, Rom 10:13, James 4:8, Heb 11:6.
27 Clifford (1877: 5).
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and J.L. Mackie have advanced versions of this objection. Flew argues 
that believing on sufficient evidence is to reject a principle ‘fundamental 
to personal and intellectual integrity’28 and Mackie argues that trying to 
cultivate belief for Pascalian reasons is ‘to do violence to one’s reason and 
understanding’.29
In response, I  would first like to note that this seems like more of 
an objection to (1), my first premise, which I take myself to have assumed 
rather than argued for. However, one still might worry that something 
is defective if our belief forming habits are overly encroached by the 
prudential.
First, I want to note that, as stated above, I am not saying we should 
spontaneously and intentionally believe on the basis of my argument, 
but rather that we should take actions that will cause (or probably cause) 
our beliefs to change in certain ways. Thus, the relevant decision isn’t 
about what to believe, but about what belief-forming habits to cultivate. 
But should prudential considerations play into our belief forming habits? 
I think they obviously should. Simple reflection on one’s doxastic habits 
shows that prudential considerations: i.e. the importance of a  belief, 
what’s at stake given that belief, etc., seem like important guides for belief 
formation. For example, every time one considered any proposition p, 
they could simple form the belief ‘p or not p.’ Additionally, one could read 
and believe every proposition in the phonebook. Both of these strategies 
would be effective ways to form lots of true beliefs, but they both seem 
silly to us. This is because prudential norms, not merely epistemic ones, 
are relevant to for one’s habits of belief formation.30
If one still isn’t convinced, I offer the following case. The mafia kidnaps 
your family and is going to kill them all unless you meet their demands. 
Their condition is that you take a pill that will give you the following 
false belief: the 500th digit of pi is 2. (It is actually 1.) It seems clear that 
you should take the pill; this is a case where you should cause yourself to 
form a belief for a non-epistemic reason.
Third, I  want to note that, even if someone takes herself to be 
breaking an  important epistemic rule if she tries to change her beliefs 
for a decision theoretic reason, this can actually be incorporated into the 
utility function by calculating a cost for breaking the rule and subtracting 
28 Flew (1976: 64).
29 Mackie (1982: 202).
30 See Grimm (2008: 726) and Feldman (2000).
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it from the utility of that option. This might not be necessary in many 
cases, but it is also important to note that it is possible to incorporate 
the cost of believing on a non-epistemic basis into the expected utility 
equation.
Finally, I  want to note that even if someone’s theistic beliefs are 
irrational, this doesn’t seem to automatically rule out their having 
a meaningful relationship with God. A relationship can be meaningful 
even if one person’s belief that the other exists is unjustified. For 
example, suppose sceptical arguments convince me to withhold belief 
that my mother exists. I also have an irrational belief that magic 8-balls 
are infallible; I ask the 8-ball if my mother exists, and it answers ‘yes’. On 
this basis, I come to believe in the existence of my mother. I call her and 
tell her I  love her; I visit her and we spend time enjoying each other’s 
company. I see no reason to think this can’t be a meaningful relationship, 
even if my belief in my mother’s existence is unjustified. 31
A  third objection involves the consideration that there are many 
different religions that are mutually exclusive. This seems troubling, 
because given only what I have argued above, it is unclear which religion 
one should pick.32 This worry includes the fact that in my sample decision 
matrix at the end of section III, (p) and (p’) do not exhaust the probability 
space. My response to this is twofold. First, the main reason Schellenberg 
thinks God wouldn’t allow non-resistant non-belief is because it seems 
difficult, if not impossible, to have a relationship with a being you do not 
believe exists. However, general theistic beliefs seem to allow the believer 
to have at least some sort of relationship with God. It is very unlikely that 
any single person has every theological doctrine correct – many people 
have deep, meaningful relationships with God with many incorrect 
beliefs about Him. For many people, basic theistic beliefs would be 
sufficient for a relationship with God; theists will often not count as non-
believers in the sense relevant for Schellenberg’s argument.
Second, if one can argue that the objective probability of one religion 
is higher than the others, when combined with my argument, there will 
be a powerful decision theoretic reason to cultivate belief in that religion. 
31 Some have suggested that God would prefer atheists who don’t believe for epistemic 
reasons to theists who believe for prudential reasons. However, religious texts suggest 
this is not the case – they emphasize belief in God simpliciter, not epistemic belief to the 
exclusion of prudential belief.
32 Versions of this objection are made by Sober and Mougin (1994), Cargile (1966), 
and Mackie (1982: 203).
102 LIZ JACKSON
Of course, cultivating theistic beliefs is an  important first step, as my 
argument shows. But it also shows that we have a  decision-theoretic 
reason to favour religions with an infinite utility and a high probability. 
Arguments that raise the probability of a particular religion, then, are 
potentially quite significant when considered alongside my argument 
above.
V. A RESPONSE TO SCHELLENBERG
So far, we’ve established that it is prudentially rational to cultivate theistic 
beliefs. How does this interact with Schellenberg’s original argument? 
Consider the first conjunct of the condition for resistant non-belief:
(1) (i) S believes <she has a stronger reason to believe p than to hold 
any other doxastic attitude toward p> OR (ii) S is blameworthy for 
lacking the belief of (i).
Suppose my argument that one should attempt to be a theist is correct. 
It still seems like I  haven’t established that a  large majority of people 
actually fulfil condition (1). It could be that, in fact, it is prudentially 
rational to cultivate theistic beliefs, but a very small number of people 
actually believe this (and so many do not fulfil (i)). Additionally, among 
those who are don’t believe this, it is implausible that they are culpable 
for lacking this belief (and so many others do not fulfil (ii)). Why think 
that there are very few non-resistant non-believers?
Consider the first disjunct of (1). Then consider the set of all the 
people that have considered arguments for theism (or arguments for 
Pascal’s Wager) and find them compelling or convincing. Many of these 
people will fulfil condition (i). Arguments that God exists or arguments 
that compel one to cultivate theistic beliefs may reduce the number of 
non-resistant non-believers.33
However, this is only a  small number of people. What about the 
second disjunct of (1), condition (ii)? When is one blameworthy for 
lacking a  belief? Even if it is true that many people should cultivate 
theistic beliefs, that doesn’t mean they are blameworthy for failing to do 
so. They may not be aware of their obligation, or there may be other 
factors that excuse them. Still, I  think there are other features of the 
above Pascalian argument that can closely tie it to blame, namely, the 
stakes involved in theism. Consider the following principle:
33 See Rota (2016).
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Blame-Stakes Principle (BSP): For all the propositions S should 
believe, all else equal, the higher the stakes are with respect to 
a proposition p, the more likely it is that S is blameworthy for not 
believing the proposition p (or for not doing everything she can to 
ensure she believes that p).
To see the plausibility of BSP, I will give two examples. Suppose my friend 
Sarah tells me she is hungry. I tell her that I have a sandwich she can have. 
I know the sandwich is made with either peanut butter or almond butter, 
but I don’t know which. But it doesn’t really matter; she likes both. I give 
her the sandwich and she eats it. This is a  typical low-stakes scenario 
where I am not blameworthy for lacking the belief about what exactly 
the sandwich contains. In a  second scenario, suppose the sandwich is 
made with peanut butter. I know Sarah absolutely hates peanut butter – it 
is one of her least favourite foods, and the mere thought of it makes her 
gag. It seems like I should check, form the belief <the sandwich is made 
with peanut butter >, and not give Sarah the sandwich. In this second 
situation, if I  give her the sandwich without checking its contents, it 
is more plausible that I  am blameworthy. Third, suppose I  know that 
Sarah is deathly allergic to peanut butter – so allergic, that if she eats 
the sandwich, she will need to be rushed to the emergency room and 
probably die. In this case, it is completely clear that if I don’t check to see 
what is in the sandwich and form the corresponding belief, I am culpable. 
Because of the exceedingly high stakes involved in the proposition <the 
sandwich is made with peanut butter>, I am responsible if I fail to form 
a  belief about the sandwich’s contents. This example shows that my 
failure to fulfil my duties with respect to propositions I should believe is 
more likely to make me culpable as the stakes get higher.
What if I am unaware of the high stakes surrounding a proposition? 
In some cases, this may make a difference – if, in the second scenario, 
I  didn’t know Sarah hated peanut butter, then it is plausible that I’m 
not culpable for giving her the sandwich without checking its contents. 
However, in other cases, the stakes are so high that I’m culpable for my 
ignorance, even if I  don’t have an  explicit belief about the stakes. For 
example, in the third scenario, even vague, inconclusive evidence that 
Sarah is deathly allergic to peanut butter should cause me to check. 
I needn’t have a categorical belief about the stakes; my suspicion of the 
mere possibility of the high stakes is enough for my culpability. Thus, 
I needn’t have an explicit belief about the high stakes of a proposition to 
be culpable for my doxastic attitude toward it.
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Another case to motivate BSP: Suppose you are hiking and you come 
to a  shallow, wide ditch that is 6 inches deep. You want to get to the 
other side, and for fun, you decide to see if you can jump across. The 
bottom of the ditch is covered in soft grass, so there is almost no chance 
of getting hurt if you fall. You have self-esteem issues and are notoriously 
pessimistic about your abilities, especially your long jumping abilities. 
Epistemically, you should believe that you can make the jump, but the 
stakes are so low that it doesn’t really matter if you form the belief or not; 
you are not blameworthy.
Alternatively, suppose you are hiking with your child, and you come 
across a wide chasm. This chasm is hundreds of feet deep. You can jump 
across, but the only way your child can get across is if you throw him. 
If you don’t throw him, you can’t get back to base camp and he will 
definitely die. You are pessimistic about your throwing abilities, but this 
is your only chance of survival. If you do everything you can to convince 
yourself you will successfully get him across the chasm, you can cultivate 
the courage to throw him. You should believe you can make the throw 
successfully, and, since inevitable death of your son is the other option, 
it is plausible that you are blameworthy if you don’t.34 This example 
is analogous to the wagering example in that the stakes are high, you 
have a  forced choice, the evidence for the proposition is inconclusive, 
and because of the high stakes, you are blameworthy if you don’t do 
everything you can to cultivate the belief in question.
Above, I  have argued that many people should cultivate the belief 
that God exists. Additionally, for those that accept the crucial probability 
judgment, <God exists> is a high stakes proposition – in fact, among 
those with the highest stakes, because the stakes are infinite. As 
mentioned above, people needn’t explicitly hold beliefs about these stakes 
to be culpable; when the stakes are very high, an awareness of even the 
possibility of high stakes can be sufficient for culpability. Furthermore, 
empirical evidence suggests that more people may be aware of these 
stakes than one might think. In a CBS poll of American adults, 83% of 
people indicated they believed in either heaven or hell,35 and, in another 
surprising study, 32% of people who identify as atheists and agnostics 
34 This example is inspired by the mountaineer example in William James’ ‘The Will 
to Believe,’ Part X, section 31.
35 ‘CBS News Poll: Americans’ Views on Death.’ CBSNews. (April 2014).
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indicated they believed in an afterlife.36 I suspect these numbers may be 
even higher in many places outside the US.
Now, consider the set of people who accept the crucial probability 
judgment. Chances are, as the surveys above indicate, quite a  large 
number of them at least believe an afterlife is possible, and many explicitly 
believe in life after death. It seems like almost everyone who believes 
in an  afterlife and accepts the crucial probability judgment would be 
aware of the high stakes surrounding their beliefs about God. Of course, 
many of these people might not be convinced they should simply do 
whatever they can to cause themselves to believe in God. For example, 
they might have a  firm conviction that their beliefs should always be 
based on evidence. (While I argue this is false in the objections section 
above, I admit it has intuitive appeal.) These people may not be culpable 
for failing to do everything they can to cause themselves to believe in 
God, but they are culpable for not taking theism more seriously. They see 
that what one chooses to believe about God potentially has momentous 
consequences, but they live their lives giving God little to no thought. 
Surely, a subset of this group is culpable for their failure to take theism 
seriously, and as a  result, they are resistant non-believers. Because 
so much hangs on one’s beliefs about God, many of the world’s non-
believers are actually resistant.
So, because so much is at stake with respect to belief in God, it is 
plausible that many people are culpable for ignoring questions about 
God’s existence. Those who do so are practically irrational. Many of 
these people are resistant non-believers. Here is another way to look 
at it: there are high risks and high rewards that surround the question 
of God’s existence. The stakes are so high that many of the people who 
ignore these stakes and fail to believe in God are actually resistant.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I  have argued that God is not hidden because we have 
a  decision-theoretic reason to believe in him. I  have first argued that 
belief in God is prudentially rational as long as (i) one assigns IUP a non-
zero, non-infinitesimal probability, (ii) we modify the way expected 
36 ‘Survey: 32% of Atheists & Agnostics Believe in an Afterlife.’ The Skeptics Guide to 
the Universe. (2014).
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value has been traditionally calculated to accommodate infinite utilities 
and (iii) the probability that <theists receive infinite utility in the afterlife 
and atheists do not> is higher than the probability that <atheists receive 
infinite utility in the afterlife and theists do not>. Then, I have shown 
why the widespread duty to cultivate theistic beliefs, along with theism’s 
high stakes imply it is likely that many non-believers are resistant.
While this result functions as a partial response to Schellenberg, there 
is room for further research. As noted at the beginning of the paper, for 
a full response to the deductive version of Schellenberg’s argument, one 
would need to combine my argument with another argument that those 
who don’t count as resistant by my lights are, in fact, resistant. Or, one 
could argue that, even if they aren’t resistant, there is some greater good 
that justifies God’s allowing non-resistant non-belief. While, hopefully, 
my argument makes either of these tasks easier than they otherwise 
would have been, completing these tasks could provide a  complete 
response to the deductive version of the hiddenness argument. Second, 
as I note in the objection section, one could give arguments that raise 
the probability of a particular religion, and that would give one reason 
to cultivate beliefs in a particular religion. While I do not think this is 
necessary for responding to Schellenberg, it would enhance my basic 
response above.37
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bartha, Paul. 2007. ‘Taking Stock of Infinite Value: Pascal’s Wager and Relative 
Utilities’, Synthese, 154 (1): 5–52
Cargile, James. 1966. ‘Pascal’s Wager’, in Philosophy, edited by Steven M. Cahn 
and David Shatz (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 250ff
‘CBS News Poll: Americans’ Views on Death.’ CBSNews. (April 2014). Accessed 
December 20, 2015. Available at: <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-
news-poll-americans-views-on-death/>
Chen, Eddy, and Daniel Rubio. ‘Surreal Decisions.’ MS
37 Thanks to Michael Rea, Chris Shields, Amanda MacAskill, Caleb Ontiveros, 
Trent Dougherty, Rebecca Chan, Andy Rogers, and audiences at Notre Dame’s Center 
for Philosophy of Religion, the 2015 Eastern Meeting of the Society for Christian 
Philosophers, and the 2015 Meeting of the British Society for Philosophy of Religion for 
their helpful comments and discussions that improved this paper in many ways. Thanks 
especially to Michael Rea for helpful comments on many drafts of this paper.
107WAGERING AGAINST DIVINE HIDDENNESS
Clifford, W.K. 1877. ‘The Ethics of Belief ’, Contemporary Review, 29
Dougherty, Trent. 2012. ‘Reducing Responsibility’, European Journal of 
Philosophy, 20 (4): 534-547
Edwards, Jonathan. 1998. The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol 2. (Hendrickson 
Pub.)
Feldman, Richard. 2000. ‘The Ethics of Belief ’, Philosophical and Phenomenological 
Research, 60 (3): 667-695
Flew, Antony. 1976. The Presumption of Atheism and Other Philosophical Essays 
on God, Freedom, and Immortality (New York: Harper and Row)
Grimm, Stephen. 2008. ‘Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 77 (3): 725-744
Hajek, Alan. 2003. ‘Waging War on Pascal’s Wager’, Philosophical Review, 112 
(1): 27-56
Jackson, Elizabeth and Andrew Rogers. ‘Salvaging Pascal’s Wager.’ MS
James, William. 1897. ‘The Will to Believe’, in The Will to Believe and Other Essays 
in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.), pp. 1-15
Mackie, J. L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the Existence 
of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Martin, Robert. 2013. ‘The St. Petersburg Paradox’, in the Stanford Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-stpetersburg/
Mougin, Gregory and Elliott Sober. 1994. ‘Betting Against Pascal’s Wager’, Noûs, 
28 (3): 382-395
Nover, Harris and Alan Hájek. 2004. ‘Vexing Expectations’, Mind 113 (450): 237-
249
Rota, Michael. 2016. Taking Pascal’s Wager (Downers Grove: IVP Academic)
Schellenberg, J. L. 1993. Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press)
Schellenberg, J. L. 2005a. ‘The hiddenness argument revisited (I)’, Religious 
Studies, 41: 287–303
Schellenberg, J. L. 2005b. ‘The hiddenness argument revisited (II)’, Religious 
Studies, 41: 287–303
Scott-Kakures, Dion. 2000. ‘Motivated Believing: Wishful and Unwelcome’, 
Nous, 34: 348-75
Stump, Eleonore and Norman Kretzmann. 1981. ‘Eternity’, Journal of Philosophy, 
78 (8): 429-458
‘Survey: 32% of Atheists & Agnostics Believe in an Afterlife.’ The Skeptics Guide 
to the Universe. (2014). Accessed December 20, 2015. Available at: <http://
www.theskepticsguide.org/one-third-of-atheists-agnostics-believe-in-an-
afterlife>
Vander Lann, David. ‘The Paradox of End without End.’ MS
108 LIZ JACKSON
Wainwright, William. 2001. ‘Jonathan Edwards and the Hiddenness of God’, in 
Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul 
Moser (West Nyack, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press), pp. 98-119
Williams, Bernard. 1970. ‘Deciding to Believe’, in Language, Belief, and 
Metaphysics, edited by Howard E. Kiefer and Milton K. Munitz (Albany: 
SUNY Press), pp. 95-111
